The European Union is, in essence, a collection of multiple nation-states, each with different perceptions of the threats it faces, conflicting economic interests, and sometimes divergent or even contradictory visions for dealing with the outside world. Therefore, reaching a consensus on a major idea, such as full self-reliance in security and defense without the United States, is extremely difficult. When delving into the structural obstacles facing this ambition, the divergences become even clearer. These are not marginal disagreements that can be overcome with directives from Brussels, but fundamental differences in vision and priorities. Furthermore, the issue of defense spending emerges as a critical point of weakness. On one hand, Europeans have provided significant support to Ukraine politically, economically, and militarily. Yet the essential, undeniable truth is that Europe's capabilities remain limited without American support, whether in intelligence, logistics, or even the implicit nuclear umbrella. American interests still require a prosperous and stable Europe, even if it remains dependent on American power to provide ultimate security guarantees. Managing this relationship requires acknowledging reality as it is, without falling into the trap of excessive patronage on one side or irresponsible abandonment on the other, while avoiding mutual blame and inflated expectations. The alternative is a vicious cycle of American blame and European frustration, where each side refuses to recognize the structural imbalances governing the transatlantic relationship—a path that serves neither party's interests. Europe lacks the unified political will, sufficient economic capacity, and strategic cohesion to act as a single geopolitical power. Defense spending has become a point of weakness after NATO member states assumed they did not need to increase it under the American security umbrella. As the war continues, signs of European unity are beginning to erode, reflecting the fragility of internal consensus during prolonged crises. This does not mean Europe has lost its importance or that the transatlantic relationship has become worthless; it means the need for realism in understanding what European strategic autonomy actually means. This has allowed it to build generous welfare states while its militaries remained small and with low readiness. Therefore, the idea of a sudden shift toward developing military and industrial capabilities sufficient for genuine strategic independence seems closer to fantasy, as it would require decades of massive investment, significant political capital, and deep economic restructuring. The war in Ukraine has revealed the European Union's potential and its limitations simultaneously. Naturally, and necessarily, Europe must take a major responsibility in its own defense, work on developing stronger defense capabilities, and seek to reduce its dependence on both Washington and Beijing. However, the idea that Europe is currently capable of being an independent pole in a multipolar world, exerting broad global influence, and fully protecting itself without American participation remains largely an unfulfilled ambition. Thus, the real question is not whether Europe can achieve full strategic independence (it cannot in the foreseeable future), but whether it can develop sufficient capabilities to become a more reliable, credible, and less fragile partner. This is a more modest but more realistic and achievable goal. As for Washington, the implications of this equation are clear: pushing Europe toward greater self-sufficiency is a logical direction, but expecting miracles on this front is not. Germany, whose economy relies heavily on exports, is reluctant to confront China or Russia directly, although recent circumstances have partially pushed it to reconsider this course. France, on the other hand, sees itself as a major world power with broad interests extending to Africa and the Indo-Pacific region. In contrast, Poland and the Baltic states see their absolute security priority in containing Russia, while Southern European countries focus on migration and stability in the Mediterranean region. The discussion of European strategic autonomy has once again taken center stage in Brussels and other European capitals, following Donald Trump's return to the White House, ongoing doubts about the U.S. commitment to NATO, and the war in Ukraine. European leaders today face a renewed reality: excessive reliance on Washington to guarantee Europe's security involves deep problems, and the time has come to assume greater responsibility in this area. However, this discourse is not entirely new. It has been heard by Europeans before, during the Suez Canal crisis and after Trump's first election, when European leaders also spoke of their determination to chart a course independent of the United States. But reality has imposed itself each time, limiting the translation of these statements into practical steps. The fundamental problem is clearly Europe's lack of three crucial elements: unified political will, sufficient economic capacity, and the strategic cohesion needed to act as a single geopolitical player. For decades, NATO member states have assumed they did not need a significant increase in defense spending under the American security umbrella.
